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Transportation Networks
Abstract
This article presents a dynamic decision support methodology forcounter-terrorism
decision support. The initial sections introduce basic objectives and challenges of terrorism
risk analysis and risk management. The remainder of the paper describes TRANSEC, a
decision support framework for defining, validating, and monitoring strategies focused on
managing terrorism risks to international transportation networks. The methodology and
software tools underlying TRANSEC are applicable to other homeland security problems,
such as critical infrastructure and border protection.
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Decision Support for Countering
Terrorist Threats against
Transportation Networks
By Richard Adler, Ph.D. and Jeff Fuller

Introduction: Challenges for Managing Risks from
Terrorism
Improved intelligence sharing is helping Homeland Security authorities
identify terrorist threats more effectively. However, this progress accentuates key "downstream" problems for decision-makers:
• Analyzing credible but imprecisely defined terrorist threats.
• Formulating strategies to mitigate risks from terrorist threats and
understanding their likely consequences and costs.
• Revalidating and adapting strategies as the risk landscape evolves over
time.
Conventional decision support methods and tools lack the horsepower
required to address these program-level tasks effectively. For example,
spreadsheets and other simulation engines excel at manipulating numeric
data, projecting quantitative trends, and the like. However, they fall short
in depicting and leveraging critical knowledge about security that is
largely qualitative, uncertain, and incomplete. Key examples include
intelligence about terrorist objectives, resources, and behaviors; economic forces and technological trends; and the challenges of implementing complex security initiatives. Lacking robust frameworks for analyzing
the dynamics of terrorism risk and risk mitigation strategies, authorities
are seriously hampered in their efforts to protect the nation.
This article presents a dynamic decision support methodology for
counter-terrorism decision support. The initial sections introduce basic
objectives and challenges of terrorism risk analysis and risk management.
The remainder of the paper describes TRANSEC, a decision support
framework for defining, validating, and monitoring strategies focused on
managing terrorism risks to international transportation networks. The
methodology and software tools underlying TRANSEC are applicable to
other homeland security problems, such as critical infrastructure and border protection.
43
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Analyzing Risks from Terrorist Attacks
Classic risk assessment methodologies focus on identifying relevant
threats and estimating their relative likelihoods and expected impacts.1
The United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has adopted
the following analytic construct for assessing risks, not only from terrorist
attacks but also from natural disasters such as hurricanes, earthquakes,
and epidemics:2
Risk = Threat x Consequence x Vulnerability.
For terrorism risks, analysts evaluate threats by estimating the capability
and intent of terrorists to carry out specific types of attacks against identified targets, such as driving a truck carrying a bomb into a facility in the
Port of Miami or firing a shoulder-launched missile (MANPAD) at an aircraft from the perimeter of Los Angeles International Airport. Vulnerability is estimated in terms of physical accessibility and security defenses
already in place to deter or prevent attacks. Finally, Consequence hinges
on estimated impacts, such as loss of life and economic effects should an
attack succeed.
For example, within DHS, the United States Coast Guard (USCG) has
developed and deployed a maritime security analysis model (MSRAM).3
MSRAM analyzes the threat of terrorist attacks against 63 classes of
potential targets in and around the nation's ports and waterways, including various types of passenger and cargo vessels, terminals and other port
facilities, utilities, and other infrastructure. Twenty-three attack modes
are proposed, such as aquatic mines or Improvised Explosive Devices
(IEDs), small aircraft, bomb-laden trucks, and hijacked vessels used as
weapons. MSRAM depicts the threat for each such target-attack mode
pairings via quantitative estimates of terrorist intent and capabilities to
carry out these scenarios, together with confidence levels in these judgments. These data are supplied by the USCG Intelligence Coordination
Center (ICC).
MSRAM estimates vulnerability as a function of three factors: Attack
Achievability, System Security, and Target Hardness. Attack Achievability
is assessed in terms of factors such as geography, weather, and the complexity of the attack mode. System Security measures the capability of key
government and commercial security authorities to interdict attacks.
Finally, Target Hardness refers to the target's estimated capability to
withstand particular attack modes, such as a bomb blast or release of toxic
chemicals, and maintain operations.
44
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Finally, MSRAM assesses the consequences of target-attack mode combinations in terms of estimated deaths, injuries, primary economic and
environmental impacts, effects on national security, and symbolic significance. Economic impacts include property damage and immediate costs
of disruption and substitution. Primary economic consequences can be
mitigated by the capability of security actors to respond effectively to successful attacks; e.g., neutralizing attackers, putting out fires, providing
emergency medical services, decontaminating sites, etc. MSRAM also
attempts to estimate the secondary economic impacts of attacks, such as
the net losses to commercial aviation from disruptions in air travel following the 9/11 attack. Mitigating factors for the component of consequence
include redundancy of facilities (e.g., multiple cranes or docks) and preparedness to recover operational capabilities promptly.
The USCG deploys MSRAM as a PC-based application, backed by extensive training. Captains of the Port and their staff apply MSRAM to assess
risks at their (local) level on an annual basis. The USCG rolls up MSRAM
data and applies it to prioritize critical maritime security investments at
local, regional, and national levels.

Managing Risk from Terrorist Threats
Once risks have been assessed through models such as MSRAM, the question naturally arises of reducing exposure to these risks. In other words,
how do we manage risks once they are analyzed uniformly to allow ranking and other types of comparisons?
In particular, what allocations of and investments in new personnel,
training, systems, technologies, and other resources will improve capabilities to prevent attacks and to respond effectively should interdiction
efforts fail? How and when will these strategies reduce vulnerabilities and
consequences? How robust are these strategies to changes in adversaries'
tactics and weapons? Finally, how can risk mitigation activities and
investments be managed as a diversified portfolio to maximize reduction
of risk exposure not only across geographically distributed threats and
targets, but also across plausible future conditions?
Managing risks from terrorist threats generally involves two types of situational interventions.4 First, exposure to risk can be addressed by reducing vulnerabilities. For example, buildings or building complexes such as
ports or airports can be hardened by adding barriers around their perimeters, making them harder to attack with vehicles carrying bombs. Similarly, adding security patrols or sensor systems reduces vulnerability by
45
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increasing the likelihood of deterring or interdicting terrorists before they
can carry out their threatened attacks.
Second, assuming that attacks are successful, risk can be managed by
improving response and recovery capabilities thereby minimizing or containing consequences. For example, improving communication systems
and coordination capabilities of local law enforcement, other first
responders, and relevant commercial or government property owners
enhances response capabilities and mitigation consequences. These interventions can also reduce vulnerability by improving detect/decide/
engage/defeat functions of system security.
Systems designed to analyze risk can often be extended to manage risk, at
least at a basic level. First, one applies the given model to analyze risk at
the present time based on inputs that describe the current security conditions (e.g., threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences). Next, one computes risk based on inputs that are altered to reflect one or more proposed
security measures. Finally, comparing current risk to the risk projected
for projected new security programs yields a differential analysis of risk
management strategies. MSRAM, for example, provides this kind of
"before-after" capability.

Additional Risk Mitigation Factors
We contend that methods for assessing risk mitigation strategies must
reflect four additional critical factors in order to be truly effective. These
factors relate to financial and dynamic temporal aspects of risk and risk
reduction.
First, reducing risk (by improving security effectiveness) is not a discrete
action undertaken at a single instant, but rather an extended process that
is executed over time. In particular, security measures require months to
years to develop, deploy, and perfect. They cannot simply be "switched
on." And their success in achieving their objectives is by no means guaranteed: programs may be deficient in design or execution or they may not
yield the anticipated effects. In short, managing risk involves a more
granular approach than simply measuring risk exposure or reduction via
"snapshot" measurements or extrapolations at discrete points in time.
Second, the risk "landscape" will inevitably evolve continually over the
periods it takes to implement new security strategies: socio-political and
economic conditions shift, technologies advance, and so on. Equally
important, terrorist groups detect and respond to changes in their envi46
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ronment, adapting their objectives, capabilities, tactics, and strategies
accordingly. This includes working to circumvent announced security
measures underway and/or shifting to other targets and methods. Risk
management methods must explicitly anticipate the potential impact of
these exogenous factors in designing and executing risk reduction strategies.
Third, from a policy standpoint, risk management strategies cannot be
decoupled from their financial "footprints:" decisions to adopt new strategies must explicitly estimate the anticipated costs of competing
approaches and weigh them against projected benefits. Cost-benefit
tradeoffs (over time) are particularly critical to portfolio-based
approaches to minimizing risk across threats and geographical locales.
Finally, focusing on cost and (change over) time materially affects the
structuring of risk strategies. Currently, security programs tend to be
designed monolithically, to achieve a specific level of risk reduction at
some target point in the future. Real options theory suggests a more
fine-grained approach.5 Originally developed for designing financial
derivatives, options theory is increasingly used in high-risk, high-cost
decisions involving drug research and development and manufacturing
capacity. The core idea is to segment programs into smaller pieces with
several checkpoints in the future where go/no-go decisions can be made
based on the situation and value of the investment at those points in time.
For example, factories can be designed in a modular manner to provide an
initial expansion short-term, with options to expand incrementally (and
cost effectively) if future product demand warrants it.
Security programs can be structured more flexibly through options to
achieve escalating levels of protection that can be adopted to reflect risk
exposure as it evolves over time. Terrorism is an economically asymmetric threat: our adversaries seek to provoke us to invest in ruinously costly
national-scale countermeasures by carrying out (or merely threatening to
stage) single attacks via new modes (e.g., chemical weapons, recruiting
indigenous vs. foreign suicide bombers). A more adaptive approach that
accommodates staging security programs to achieve deterrence before
moving onto prevention is an essential enhancement in our thinking
about counter-terrorism.
In short, analyzing risk tends to be a static activity anchored to specific
points in time. However, risk evolves continually, driven by changes in the
world at large. Correspondingly, managing risk is an inherently dynamic
and, ideally, adaptive process: authorities must anticipate both the evolution of risks and extended program deployment cycles in devising new
47
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security strategies, track risk reduction performance and changes in risk
landscapes over time, and adjust strategies as appropriate.
The remainder of this article describes TRANSEC, a decision support tool
that addresses these core aspects of managing terrorism risk. TRANSEC
is implemented using advanced scenario-based "what-if" dynamic simulation and analysis software called ForeTell.6 The system helps authorities
evaluate risk reduction strategies by projecting the consequences of proposed security measures and comparing their capabilities (and costs) to
reduce risk from terrorist threats over time and across alternate future
conditions.

Background–Terrorism Threats Involving
Transportation Networks
TRANSEC addresses two categories of terrorist threats against transportation systems:
• Interdicting direct terrorist attacks against international transports
such as vessels and aircraft and debarkation points such as ports and
airports;
• Interdicting attempts to transfer individual terrorists or materiel into
our country for purposes of carrying out attacks later.7
Domestic homeland security efforts today focus primarily on the first category ? threats of direct attack. As noted earlier, the canonical risk analysis construct is:
Risk = Threat x Vulnerability x Consequence.
Numerous challenges arise in estimating these three factors uniformly
and accurately, but the basic framework is relatively clear.8
The terror transfer threat consists of the movement of terrorists and
materiel (including components of weapons of mass destruction) into our
country via independent transport modes from multiple countries and
shipping points. Once inside our borders, terrorists and materiel can be
moved via domestic transport modes and assembled to perpetrate attacks
elsewhere.
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Terrorist transfer threats are open-ended in nature because they involve
the staging of resources into our country prior to attacks. The standard
Risk construct does not apply because specific targets and attack modes
are generally not known at this stage.
However, transfer threats cannot be ignored or dismissed simply because
they are complex and challenging to model and analyze. On the contrary,
we contend that the risks are too great not to attempt a systematic analytic approach, despite the inherent difficulties. In particular, we argue
that making any progress on blocking transfer threats will reduce the
scope of the "downstream" problem of interdicting terrorists as they
attempt to launch direct attacks from within our borders. Hence, interdicting such piecemeal transfer threats before they penetrate our borders
is a critical security priority.

TRANSEC–Decision Support for Managing
Terrorism Risks in Transportation9
TRANSEC models risk assessments for both (or either) terrorist transfer
and transportation system attack threats. It then models and helps refine
and validate strategies for mitigating those risks. TRANSEC utilizes open
source intelligence,10 expert judgments of security analysts, and inputs
produced by other risk analysis tools such as MSRAM.
TRANSEC employs a dynamic multi-tiered decision model that abstracts
terrorist threats into a network. The nodes of this network consist of the
following entity types: Terrorist Groups, Countries of Origin, Points of
Embarkation, International Transport Modes, Country of Destination,
and associated Points of Debarkation. Figure 1 depicts this network model
from a stylized geospatial perspective.
For transfer threats, TRANSEC breaks out two categories of risk—transfers of individuals and material from foreign countries to our borders.
Examples of materiel include conventional and chemical, biological,
radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) weapons (or weapon components).
For direct attack threats, TRANSEC focuses on two types of targets—
Debarkation Points and International Transports. To minimize input
requirements, the current version clusters attack modes into three categories: Emplaced, Standoff, and Hijack. Emplaced means that terrorists
launch attacks aboard vessels, planes, trains, etc., while Standoff means

49

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 2, No. 3

Journal of Strategic Security

that attacks are staged from Debarkation Point perimeters. Hijack mode
only applies to Transports and assumes that the terrorists use the plane or
vessel as a weapon.

Figure 1: TRANSEC Transfer Threat Network Model
Following MSRAM's model for analyzing Risk elements, TRANSEC posits
three distinct categories of actors with capabilities to detect and/or interdict terrorist personnel and materiel: national governments, local law
enforcement agencies (LEAs), and owner/operators (OOs) of transport
modes and supporting facilities. Each category of security actor has a distinct scope of authority, responsibilities, and operations; resources; and
local presence.
For example, in maritime security scenarios, OOs are assumed to be commercial or civil entities that operate passenger or cargo vessels and terminal facilities at seaports. The lead domestic national authority for
maritime security is the U.S. Coast Guard. LEAs in the United States
include state and city police departments and emergency management
agencies. Collaboration among security players to leverage complementary detection, deterrence, and engagement capabilities is critical for
effective interdiction.
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TRANSEC defines a set of quantitative performance measures, called System Security Effectiveness (SE) metrics. SE metrics are defined for each
class of security actor and represent their capabilities to interdict transfer
threats at Embarkation, Transit, and Debarkation points and to interdict
attack threats at Transit and Debarkation points. These metrics are
assigned values from 0 to 100 and can be annotated with comments.
Table 1 summarizes TRANSEC's primary performance data elements.
Data elements for direct attack threats are shown in italics; all other data
support transfer threat modeling.
Table 1: TRANSEC Security Metrics
TRANSEC Entity

Point of Embarkation

Security Metric/Datum

Metric
Usage

Update
Security effectiveness of Owner/
Operators, Local Law Enforcement
Agencies, and National Government in Port vs. Transfer Threat of
Terrorists and Materiel
Probability of Interdicting Terror- Output
ists and Materiel
Update
Security effectiveness of Owner/
Operators, and National Government in Port vs. Transfer Threat of
Terrorists and Materiel

International Transport (by mode/category)

Security effectiveness vs. Standoff
and Emplaced/Hijacked attack
modes
Probability of Interdicting Terror- Output
ists and Materiel
Threat, Vulnerability, Consequence, and Risk of Attack via
Standoff and Emplaced/Hijacked
attack modes
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Table 1: TRANSEC Security Metrics
TRANSEC Entity

Security Metric/Datum

Metric
Usage

Update
Security effectiveness of Owner/
Operators, Local Law Enforcement
Agencies, and National Government in Port vs. Transfer Threat of
Terrorists and Materiel
Security effectiveness vs. Standoff
and Emplaced attack modes
Point of Debarkation

Probability of Interdicting TerrorOutput
ists and Materiel Aggregate Transfer Threat of Terrorist and
Materiel (broken out by Point of
Embarkation and Intl. Transport)
Threat, Vulnerability, Consequence, and Risk of Attack via
Standoff and Emplaced attack
modes
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Additional inputs include:
• Estimated capability and intent of terrorist groups to initiate transfer
threats of Terrorists and Materiel from specific countries11
• Estimated capability and intent of terrorist group to carry out attacks
against Transport and Debarkation Point nodes in Emplaced/Hijack
and Standoff modes
• Factors contributing to Vulnerability and Consequence of attack modes
relating to International Transport or Debarkation Point nodes (e.g.,
vessels, aircraft, ports)
• Assumptions about social, political, and economic forces; trends; and
disruptive events that might take place over the duration of the security
strategy 12
Finally, TRANSEC models counter-terrorism strategies via sets of security measures. Each such measure specifies an allocation of existing
resources and prospective investments to improve capabilities to interdict
terrorist personnel and/or materiel prior to or upon arrival at our borders. Security measures are characterized in terms of three types of
behavioral content:
1. Projected schedules to acquire or develop and deploy the given measure, depicted as start date and duration (in months);
2. Projected costs, expressed in terms of estimated capital expenditures
(for start-up) and annual outlays for ongoing operations, maintenance,
and support;
3. Expert assessments as to how the measures will likely impact particular
SE metrics over time.13 TRANSEC's "what-if" capabilities allow analysts to explore the impacts of alternate assumptions about how benefits will occur or fail to materialize. The latter type of analysis is critical
for assessing the potential impacts of delays, implementation errors,
technology failures, and other types of programmatic risks on security
effectiveness.
Table 2 lists several example Security Measures and their anticipated
impacts. Generally, individual Security Measures impact only one or several of the SE metrics tied to risk from transfer or attack threats.
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Table 2: Example Security Measures (and Strategies)
Index Threat Type

Security Measure/
Strategy

Expected (Causal )
Impact

1

Direct Attack

Security Training Pro- Reduce vulnerability to
gram for aircraft crew emplaced attack on
aircraft

2

Direct Attack

Passenger Scanning
Program for airport

3

Direct Attack

Procurement Program Reduce consequence
to develop Emergency of attack on airport
Medical Services capability

4

Direct Attack

Combine Measures 1,
2, and 3

Combine impacts 1,2, 3

5

Transfer

Transportation
Worker Identity Credential (TWIC) program

Reduce transfer threat
at Debarkation Points
by controlling individual access

6

Transfer

Overseas Port Security
Program to coordinate
with and certify security practices of foreign
ports and authorities

Reduce transfer threat
at Embarkation Points
by controlling individual access and materiel

7

Transfer

Intl Maritime Org.
(IMO) Shipper Security program to coordinate with and certify
security practices of
owner/operators of
vessels

Reduce transfer threat
at Intl Transport nodes
by controlling individual access and materiel

8

Transfer

Combine Measures 5,
6, and 7

Combine impacts 6,7,8

Reduce vulnerability to
emplaced attack on
airport

These inputs—transportation network nodes, security strategies and measures, environmental assumptions and events—collectively define a
TRANSEC Scenario. Figure 2 depicts the taxonomy of entity types used to
build TRANSEC Scenarios.14
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Figure 2: Entity Taxonomy for TRANSEC
The TRANSEC software system incorporates a "what-if" simulation
engine that dynamically projects the likely impacts of Security Measures
and environmental influences to generate the following outputs, in
monthly increments:
• Updates to SE metrics at all nodes in the security network.
• Probabilities of interdicting terrorists and material at Embarkation,
Transit, and Debarkation points.
• Net transfer threat risks of personnel and materiel at specific Points of
Debarkation.
• These projected values are broken out by specific combinations of
Terrorist Groups, Points of Embarkation and International Transport modes. For example, what is the risk of Transferring Personnel
at the Port of Miami from al-Qaeda operating out of the Port of Athens via a break bulk cargo vessel?
• Updated estimates of Threat, Vulnerability, and Consequence and
aggregate Risk for direct attacks, by mode, at International Transport
and Point of Debarkation nodes.
55
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For direct attack threats, TRANSEC employs the standard Threat, Vulnerability, and Consequence construct to compute Risk. For transfer threats,
TRANSEC employs a probabilistic computation using SE metrics adapted
from standard failure models used by system reliability engineers.
TRANSEC employs various other simulation techniques to model environmental dynamics.15
TRANSEC's overall data processing architecture is summarized in Figure
3. Inputs are indicated in green, while outputs are labeled in blue. The
upper half of the diagram addresses threat from direct attack, while the
lower portion focuses on transfer threats.
TRANSEC provides powerful analytic tools such as summary reports and
graphic plots to reduce simulation data. These tools help analysts quickly
compare projected outcomes to isolate the relative strengths and weaknesses of alternate strategies across diverse scenarios. Analysts can also
drill down to determine how forces, trends, events, and security measures
impacted risk or cost in particular months. Users can refine their security
strategies to incorporate attractive features of competing approaches. The
resulting strategies are robust in that they leave the country well protected despite our inherent uncertainty about the future.
A strategy, no matter how robust, must be executed effectively in order to
be successful. TRANSEC supports the post-decision phase of the strategic
life cycle with a monitoring mode: as time passes, programs are enacted.
All the while, social, political, economic, and technological conditions
change and terrorist groups evolve, adapting their capabilities, objectives,
and methods in response to the evolving landscape and their analysis of
our defenses.
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Figure 3: TRANSEC decision model architecture
Analysts use TRANSEC to update their Scenarios periodically to reflect
current intelligence and re-project the chosen security strategy.16 If the
projected outcomes are uniformly positive, the strategy has been revalidated. If not, TRANSEC acts as an Early Warning System, alerting authorities promptly to changing conditions and emerging problems. Analysts
can diagnose the problems, alter (or replace) the current security strategy,
and implement those midcourse corrections to ensure continued success.
The following figures illustrate sample outputs from TRANSEC, projecting counter-terrorism strategies described in Figure 2 above. For example, Figure 4 displays comparative time series plots projecting the
reduction of risk for transferring terrorists for two strategies. As the key
indicates, one set of curves assumes that a transportation worker identity
credential (TWIC) program is implemented, while the other set assumes a
broader program that implements security measures that impact Embarkation Points, Transport Modes, and Debarkation Points.
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Figure 4: Example TRANSEC Time Series Output
Each curve depicts the risk for a transportation network path starting out
from a particular Embarkation Point (e.g., Port of Athens) via one Transport Mode (e.g., a cruise ship) into one Debarkation Point (e.g., Port of
Miami). In this scenario, it is assumed that in month 12, Turkey joins the
European Union. The analyst postulated that the impact of this event
would be to increase the baseline transfer threat out of Europe (but not
Libya), under the assumption that Turkey's border security is inferior to
that of European Union countries, allowing freer movement of terrorists
across EU country borders.
Figure 5 displays the corresponding curves for the transfer threat of materiel. The lines signify no reduction of threats from materiel transfer
ascribable to the TWIC program alone (as expected), while the curves for
58
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the composite strategy (number 4 referenced in Figure 2) reflect threat
reduction benefits from strategies targeting foreign ports and vessel operators.

Figure 5: Example TRANSEC Time Series Output
Finally, Figure 6 displays a spider (radar) chart comparing security effectiveness metrics for Strategies 1 (TWIC only, turquoise) and 4 (Composite
strategy, red) four years into the future. Comparative analytics help decision-makers isolate relative strengths and weaknesses of security strategies and identify areas for refinement.
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Figure 6: Example TRANSEC Spider (Radar) Plot Output

Conclusions
Managing risk from terrorism threats is a dynamic and adaptive process.
Security strategies must anticipate ongoing evolution of environmental
conditions and adaptive responses by terrorists in response to these
changes and our defensive initiatives.
The critical challenge is to devise a collection of complementary security
measures that address the diverse components of terrorist threats—targets and transfer nodes, attack modes, vulnerability, and consequence
factors. Such strategic portfolios must (1) deliver broad spectrum risk
reduction in a cost effective manner and (2) anticipate changing risk landscapes and incomplete knowledge.
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Unfortunately, no one can predict the future reliably. Equally regrettably,
no closed-end (computationally tractable) equations exist to "optimize"
counter-terrorism preparedness investments.
TRANSEC aims for the next best thing, which is to identify and manage
robust counter-terrorism strategies. A robust strategy is one that appears
likely to produce superior reductions of risk across a range of plausible
possible futures in comparison to competing security portfolios.
TRANSEC employs scenario-based "what-if" simulations to model risk
landscapes and explore and compare alternate strategies. Authorities can
apply the same projective methods to monitor and adjust strategies as
they are executed.
TRANSEC provides a safe virtual environment for practicing
counter-terrorism strategies and learning from simulated rather than real
mistakes. It thereby reduces risk and improves confidence and consistency in strategic security decisions. In essence, TRANSEC allows authorities to "test drive" strategies much as consumers test drive cars before
buying them to minimize costly surprises and disappointments.
TRANSEC focuses on terrorism threats relating to transportation systems. However, its underlying decision support methodology and software tools are easily generalized to address other critical homeland
security decisions such as critical infrastructure and border protection.
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